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JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROCEEDING BELOW 
This appeal is from a judgment entered in the 
Small Claims Department of the Ninth Citrcuit Court, the 
Honorable Robert F. Owens presiding. The time to file the 
appeal was extended by said Judge until January 12, 1988, 
and jurisdiction vests with the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(c) of the Utah Code. R52. 
The Small Claims case was initiated by 
Respondents to recover money paid to Appellant (WESTWOOD 
CARPET [hereinafter Westwood]) for tile w(t)rk performed on 
Respondents1 house. This payment of Respondents1 money 
had been made by Southern Utah Title Company, which 
company had been earlier retained by Respondents to obtain 
a lien release from Westwood. After Westwood filed their 
release of lien, Respondents brought suit to get their 
money back. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Accord and satisfaction: The Respondents 
had entered into an accord and satisfaction with 
Appellants for the release of Appellants' lien. This 
accord and satisfaction fully performed by Appellants bars 
the maintenance of the lawsuit by Respondents. 
2. Agency and apparent authority of Southern 
Utah Title Company: The agency of Southern Utah Title 
Company to act on Respondents' behalf was disputed at the 
time of trial. Respondents, however, introduced an escrow 
instruction executed by them which authorized said title 
company to act on their behalf. Beyond this written 
authority, Respondents' actions imbued said title company 
with both apparent and ostensible authority to act on 
Respondents' behalf. These actions were relied upon by 
Appellant herein. Respondents are now estopped from 
denying such authority. 
3. Due process: The lower court entered 
judgment against every named Defendant. There is, 
however, no basis to enter Judgment against Shela Lambert, 
or Allen Lafferty, as they were not served process in this 
W083/Jones 2 
case, and Lambert appeared only as a witness. 
Furthermore, appellants were all denied a plenary hearing 
on the merits* 
4. Quantum meruit: The Court's ruling in favor 
of Respondents allows them* to retain the benefits of their 
contract with Appellants without payment for Appellants1 
work or materials, which results in a substantial 
injustice. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Citations to constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances and rules wherever appropriate will 
occur in the text of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 31, 1986, Defendant, Cathy Iverson, 
executed a written contract retaining Westwood Carpet to 
do tile work in various parts of a house under 
construction, for a total cost of $1,204.14. Rll; TBI at 
125-224. A copy of this contract purposely altered by 
Respondents, with starting and finishing dates inserted by 
them at a later time, appears in the record at R32. The 
written contract had no completion date, thus, completion 
was required within a reasonable time. TBI at 125-224. 
The tile selected for the front entryway was somewhat 
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unique and had to be specially ordered and shipped. Id. 
Westwood Carpet also known as Westwood Carpet Center, is 
licensed by the State of Utah, with a bid limit from 
$100,000.00. R10. 
After Westwood completed a majority of the work 
on Respondents' residence, Respondents requested 12 
additional feet of window sill tile work at $3.50 a linear 
square foot with mastic application. TBI at 125-224. 
Westwood further maintained at trial that the main 
entryway was paved, concereted and prepped for tile 
installation, but that when Respondents1 tile arrived 
through Milne Truck Lines, it had been damaged in transit. 
Westwood, at that time, had no other similar tile in 
stock. Id. Respondents thereafter refused to allow 
Westwood to reorder the tile or complete the work as per 
the written contract. This occurred on or about November 
26, 1986. Id. 
Westwood credited Respondents for the tile and 
unfinished labor on the front entryway, in the sum of 
$33 2.50 and the amount of $42.00 was added for the 12 
additional feet of window sill, leaving a sum due and 
owing of $913.64. Id. 
Throughout the "trial" Respondents maintained 
that the main entryway was not paved, concreted and 
prepped for tile installation. See, e.g. , TA2 at 372. 
Though the court so found at the time of trial, Appellants 
believe that Respondents1 contention was based upon Cathy 
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Iverson's perjured testimony. A motion pending the 
outcome of this appeal based on that perjury is being 
concurrently filed with the Circuit Court. 
Appellant, Westwood Carpet Center, thereafter 
filed a proper notice of mechanicfs lien, dated December 
3, 1986 and recorded as Entry No. 305875, on Respondents' 
residence. R13. Respondents thereafter retained an 
attorney, Philip L. Foremaster, who advised the them to 
deposit $1,200 with Southern Utah Title Company to resolve 
the matter, if Westwood ever pursued on its lien. 
Thereafter on February 24, 1987, Respondents placed into 
escrow with Southern Utah Title Company, the sum of $1,200 
"to ensure the payment/or release of that certain NOTICE 
OF MECHANIC'S LIEN, Filed By WESTWOOD CARPET CENTER". 
R23; TA2 at 380-390. Though Southern Utah Title Company 
always represented itself as an agent of Respondents, the 
first time these written escrow instructions executed by 
Respondents were viewed by Appellants was at the time of 
trial. 
In June 1987, Westwood retained attorney, 
MICHAEL D. HUGHES, to initiate a foreclosure action on the 
mechanic's lien. TBI at 1-30. Hughes thereafter, not 
knowing that Southern Utah Title Company had been earlier 
retained by Respondents, requested the same title company 
to provide him a preliminary foreclosure report to assist 
Hughes in filing his Complaint. Id. On September 23, 
1987, Lane Tait of Southern Utah Title Company advised 
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Hughes that he was authorized by Respondents to tender 
$1,200.00 to Hughes in in full satisfaction of Westwood1s 
mechanic's lien. Id. Hughes agreed to provide a release 
of Westwoodfs lien upon the receipt of the money. 
Southern Utah Title Company forwarded Respondent's 
$1,200.00 earlier deposited with them to Hughes' office 
requesting Hughes to "secure a release of the filed lien . 
. . " . R14. Concurrently, the title company forwarded a 
letter recounting the settlement with Hughes and detailing 
the arrangement by which the $1,200.00 would be tendered 
to secure the complete release of the lien. R21 and 22. 
The check tendered as payment in full of the Westwood 
Carpet lien appears in the record at R15. Having received 
that check, Hughes prepared and recorded Westwood's lien 
release on October 6, 1987. R17. Hughes never received 
any notice by Respondents or their title company not to 
accept the $1,200.00, or that the payment of the $1,2 00.00 
was not meant to fully resolve this matter. TBI at 1-30. 
Though these instructions and the initial funds 
were deposited with Southern Utah Title Company clearly 
gave said title company apparent and ostensible authority 
to act on Respondents' behalf, Respondents testififd 
contrary to the clear import of their actions at trial. 
Thus, when asked whether she authorized Mr. Tait to use 
the funds to be dispensed to the lien claimant as a 
settlement of the lien, Mrs. Iverson blithely replied, "Of 
course not, we didn't owe the money. Why would we do 
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that." TBI at 94-104. But, indeed, that is exactly what 
Respondents did! IcL_, at 30, 43, 51-56; TA2 at 373-405? 
see also R23. 
Six days after recording his lien release, Dwane 
Jones, doing business as Westwood, was served a Complaint 
from the Small Claims Department of Ninth Circuit Court. 
R5. Trial was set eight days later on October 20, 1987, 
at 2:00 p.m. Id. 
Shela Lambert was a sales person for Westwood, 
and Allen Lafferty assisted in the installation of tile. 
Neither of these named Defendants, however, was served, 
though Sheila Lambert appeared at trial as a witness. 
The trial was bifurcated. Hughes and Jones, 
however, as well as Hughes' secretary verified by 
affidavit that they had not received notice of the 
continued date. Regardless, and despite a plethora of 
evidence introduced during the first day of trial, the 
lower court found the Defendant Westwood to be an 
not 
unlicensed contractor and that Respondents had A given 
Southern Utah Title Company any authority to obtain the 
release of lien. TCI at 155, 166-173. Frankly, it is 
beyond Appellants' attorney's ability to conceive how the 
lower Court could have made these rulings! Furthermore, 
despite Respondents' admissions throughout trial that they 
concededly owe the Appellants at least $576.50, the lower 
court entered the Judgment against all the defendants for 
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the maximum jurisdictional amount of $1,000.00. TA2 at 
418-25, cf. TCI at 290-296, R33.) 
Thereafter Appellants filed several Affidavits 
requesting the Court to reconsider its judgment. 
Approximately two weeks after these affidavits were filed, 
the lower court, sua sponte, procured its own self-serving 
affidavit to be filed on behalf of Respondents and 
simultaneously therewith ruled, not surprisingly, in 
accordance with that affidavit. R51, 52. Thus, simply 
stated, the Judge without disclosing his affidavit to 
Hughes or to Appellants, and allowing at least an 
opportunity to respond to the same, simply enclosed it 
with his ruling. See R50 through R53. The affidavit 
procured by the Judge simply noted that notice had been 
regularly deposited by the Court Clerk for pickup by the 
lawfirm of Thompson, Hughes & Reber, at a public place. 
It, however, does not meet the issue squarely, as both 
Hughes and Lambert verified that no notice had ever been 
received by them. Regardless, it is clear from an 
examination of the file that this case should be reversed 
and that costs of this appeal should be awarded to 
Appellants. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Accord and satisfaction - Respondents 
tendered $1,200 to Southern Utah Title Company to "insure 
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the payment/or release of that certain NOTICE OF 
MECHANIC'S LIEN, Filed by WESTWOOD CARPET CENTER". R23. 
Respondents' agent offered said $1,200 in full 
satisfaction of the monies claimed due by Appellants and 
to secure, per Respondents' instructions, the release of 
Westwood's mechanic's lien. When Appellants accepted the 
$1,200, and released said lien, such acceptance amounted 
to a full satisfaction and bars Respondents from 
subsequently maintaining their lawsuit in the court below. 
As Respondents apparently empowered Southern Utah Title 
Company to obtain the satisfaction of Westwood's 
mechanic's lien, the Appellants should not suffer by being 
forced to thereafter defend a lawsuit by the agent's 
principal. See 3 Am.Jur. 2d "Agency" §81; Harrison v. 
Auto Security Company, 70 Utah 11, 257 Pac. 677 (1927); 
see also 1 Am.Jur. 2d "Accord and Satisfaction", §§1, 14, 
17, 48 and 52. 
2. Agency of Southern Utah Title Company - The 
trial Court denied that Southern Utah Title Company acted 
as Respondents' agent in tendering the $1,200 of 
Respondents' money to Appellants in full satisfaction of 
Appellants' claim and in order to obtain Appellants' 
Release of Mechanic's Lien. This ruling is expressly 
contrary to written escrow instructions executed by the 
Respondents, Ralph M. Iverson and Cathy B. Iverson, and 
introduced by Respondents at trial. R23. It is further 
contrary to the testimony of Respondents that after 
W083/Jones 9 
consulting with attorney Phillip L. Foremaster, they went 
to Southern Utah Title Company and deposited therewith 
$1,200 of Respondents1 money specifically designated to 
satisfy Appellants' Mechanic's Lien, while the written 
authorization was not disclosed to Appellant at the time 
said claim was settled in early October of 1987. TA2 at 
380-400. It is well settled in the State of Utah, that a 
principal is bound by the acts of its agent, which are 
within the "apparent scope of the authority of the agent", 
and a principal will not be permitted to deny such a 
authority against innocent third parties who have relied 
on such authority. See Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P. 2d 
(Utah 1980) . Furthermore, apparent authority exists under 
any circumstances where a party has created such an 
appearance of things "that it causes a third party 
reasonably and prudently to believe that a second party 
has the power to act on behalf of the first person. . ." 
Walker Bank & Trust Company v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73 (Utah 
1983) at 75, quoting from Wynn v. McMahon Ford Company, 
414 S.W. 2d 330 at 336 (Mo.App.1967). 
As is clearly set forth in the record at 14 and 
16, Lane Tait a representative of Southern Utah Title 
Company, tendered $1,200 "as satisfaction in full of the 
lien and action." Mr. Tait requested on behalf of his 
principals, Ralph and Cathy Iverson, that Hughes secure "a 
release of the filed lien". R14 Tait did so pursuant to 
the authority conferred upon him by the escrow 
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instructions executed by the Respondents. R23 Tait 
confirmed his actions to Respondents by a cover letter 
dated September 23, 1987. R21-23. 
Hughes, relying on Tait's representations, and 
upon the tender of Respondents' money by Tait, in good 
faith * executed and recorded a release of Westwood's 
mechanic's lien on October 6, 19 87, in compliance with 
Tait's request on behalf of his principals. R17. As a 
result thereof, the service of a suit on Hughes' client, 
Westwood Carpet, some six days later, was barred by the 
accord and satisfaction and by the acts of the 
Respondents' agent, Southern Utah Title Company. Indeed, 
were Respondents' suit to have been filed by an attorney, 
the same could have been considered nothing more or less 
than an abuse of civil process. 
3. There are three issues of due process that 
the Utah Court of Appeals must consider. First, the lower 
court entered judgment against Shela Lambert, who was 
never served and only appeared as a witness. It further 
entered judgment against Allen Lafferty, who was neither 
served nor appeared as a witness. Secondly, in denying a 
rehearing, the lower court, sua sponte, procured an 
affidavit from its own staff on Respondents' behalf. 
This, coupled with the unsubstantiated rulings in this 
case violates the essence of an independent arbitrator, to 
which Appellants have a right. Lastly, the lower court's 
denial of a retrial on this matter, though perhaps not 
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necesary to a correct ruling on appeal, evidences a 
failure to abide by basic standards of due process, that 
is, that all parties to a proceeding have notice of the 
date of its continuation and an opportunity to be heard in 
full. 
4. Quantum Meruit: Several times during 
trial, Respondents conceded that for the work performed 
they owed at least $576.50 to Appellants. It is clear, 
however, that the lower court returned to Respondents all 
but $200 and allowed Respondents to thereafter retain the 
benefits of Westwood's labors and materials, which as 
heretofore stated, completed all the terms of the 
contract, less and excepting the setting of tile in the 
front entryway, which was delayed by the destruction of 
the entryway tile in transit. It is true that the 
Respondents have contended and did contend, under oath, as 
they were reminded of the same, that the preparation work 
for the tile entryway had not been done by the Appellants. 
Whether they will maintain that false position on appeal, 
however, is unknown, but again, it is unnecessary in light 
of the issues heretofore raised. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THERE EXISTS AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES BARRING THE MAINTAINING OF A LAWSUIT BY 
RESPONDENTS. 
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Generally speaking, the issue of accord and 
satisfaction is an affimative defense which must be pled 
to be raised. Rule 8(c) URCP; Hintze v. Seaich, 20 U2d 
275, 437 P.2d 202 (1968)%. Though evidentiary and pleading 
rules are not specifically followed in the small claims 
departments of Utah's various Circuit Courts, Westwood, 
nonethless, specifically raised this issue in paragraph 9 
of its Answer, and squarely presented the same before the 
lower court. R8-9. 
In the instant case, Respondents, acting on the 
advice of their attorney, Philip L. Foremaster, executed 
escrow instructions which Respondents introduced at trial. 
TA2 at 375-390; TBI at 50-56; R23. These escrow 
instructions authorized Southern Utah Title Company to 
hold $1,200 of Respondents1 money to insure "the 
payment/or release of that certain NOTICE OF MECHANIC'S 
LIEN, Filed by WESTWOOD CARPET CENTER." R23. As stated 
in 1 Am.Jur.2d, "Accord and Satisfaction" §1: 
To constitute an accord and satisfaction, 
there must be an offer in full satisfaction of 
the obligation, accompanied by such acts and 
declarations as amount to a condition that if it 
is accepted, it is to be in full satisfaction, 
and the condition must be such that the party to 
whom the offer is made is bound to understand 
that if he accepts it, he does so subject to the 
conditions imposed. 
Lane Tait's cover letter on behalf of Southern 
Utah Title Company and ostensibly on behalf of 
Respondents, clearly sets forth that the $1,200 tendered 
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on September 23, 1987, was submitted "as satisfaction in 
full of the lien and action," R22. In exchange for the 
tender of these monies, Tait requested that Hughes "secure 
a release of the filed lien". Id. ; see also R15. With 
that letter, Tait tendered to Appellants1 attorney a check 
in the sum of $1,200. R15. Tait copied this 
correspondence to Respondents. R21. Hughes received the 
money and recorded his Release of Lien on October 6, 19 87. 
R17. 
The lower court did not find an accord and 
satisfaction. TCI at 131-160. Reviewing, however, the 
letter of Southern Utah Title Company to Hughes, together 
with the check prof erred to Hughes as well as Hughes1 
tendered counter-performance, it is abundantly clear that 
a valid accord and satisfaction occurred. As stated by 1 
AmJur 2d "Accord and Satisfaction" §14: 
A valid accord and satisfaction may result from 
an offer of payment of money upon an 
unliquidated demand conditioned upon its being 
received in full satisfaction of the 
indebtedness and the acceptance thereof by the 
creditor . . . 
Hughes, in good faith, relying upon the 
ostensible and apparent authority of Southern Utah Title 
Company to act on Respondents1 behalf, accepted said 
$1,200 in full satisfaction of Westwood!s lien. As 
Appellants fully performed pursuant to the request of the 
title company, it can hardly be gainsaid that Respondents 
should have been barred from subsequently maintaining a 
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suit to recover these monies paid, which payment indeed 
induced that performance, to-wit, the filing of the 
release of the lien. As stated by 1 AmJur 2d "Accord and 
Satisfaction" §52: 
If the accord constitutes a binding contract and 
it is fully performed, the performance satisfies 
the original claim and operates as a final bar 
to the demand or subject matter of the agreement 
for accord and satisfaction. (Iji., emp. added) 
In the instant case, the documents and testimony 
squarely support that an accord and satisfaction occurred. 
Hughes testified under oath that he had been advised by 
Tait, the agent for Southern Utah Title Company, that such 
title company indeed represented Respondents and had 
within its accounts $1,200 of Respondents' money to 
satisfy the lien claim being pursued by IHughes. Southern 
Utah Title Company acting with both express the apparent 
authority procured Westwood's release and satisfaction of 
the lien. Six days later, Appellant Dwane Jones was 
served papers in this case, seeking return of these monies 
which had heretofore been tendered to him in exchange for 
the lien release. Both Jones, and his attorney, Hughes, 
were perplexed by this chain of events. The lower court 
should have summarily dismissed Respondents1 case on the 
basis of the fully executed and performed accord and 
satisfaction. 
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II. 
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT SOUTHERN UTAH TITLE COMPANY 
WAS NOT ACTING AS AN AGENT OF RESPONDENTS IS IN ERROR. 
In attempting to avoid a finding of accord and 
satisfaction as a bar to Respondents1 case, the lower 
court found that there was no valid agency created for the 
title company to seek satisfaction of the lien claimed. 
TCI at 150-165. In so ruling, the lower court completely 
emaciated the well-developed common law rationale of 
ostensible and apparent authority. It is clear in the 
instant case that Respondents acting on the advice of 
attorney, Phillip L. Foremaster, deposited with Southern 
Utah Title Company, the sum of $1,200 " to insure the 
payment/or release of that certain NOTICE OF MECHANIC'S 
LIEN Filed by WESTWOOD CARPET CENTER, said Lien Notice 
recorded December 3, 1986, as Entry No. 305875, in Book 
434, at Page 19 of the Official Washington County 
Recorder's Office." R23. When attorney Hughes was 
retained to file suit on behalf of Westwood Carpet Center, 
he requested the same title company to prepare a 
foreclosure report. Thereafter, Tait, a principal of said 
title company contacted Hughes to settle Westwood!s claim 
for $1,200. A memorandum evidencing that conversation is 
in the record at page 16. Tait subsequently memorialized 
the accord to Hughes on September 23, 1987, with a copy 
going to Respondents. R14, R21-22. Enclosed with the 
letter was a check for $1,200 tendered to Hughes with the 
notation thereon "payment in full: Westwood Carpet Lien". 
R15. Tait's letter further requested that in exchange for 
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the sum of $1,200, which sum had been deposited in cash 
with the title company by Respondents, |that Hughes secure 
a release of lien, so that the same could be filed in 
Washington County. R22. It is important to note that 
this $1,200 was not money paid by a tfitle company, but 
rather, was derived from sums of money directly deposited 
with the title company by Respondents pursuant to the 
escrow agreement introduced by Respondents at trial at 
R23. 
Tait's closing paragraph is telling: "I would 
appreciate having you secure a release of the filed lien 
and forward to us for recording as soon as possible. 
Please let me know if there is any question." Tait's 
letter to Hughes indicates that a copy was sent to the 
Respondents and indeed, at R21 through R22, that copy 
appears together with a cover letter evidencing the reason 
said money was tendered to Hughes in satisfaction of the 
lien. Thereafter, Respondents never cpntacted Southern 
Utah Title Company nor took any action to dispute the 
title company's actions in distributing the money pursuant 
to the cover letter directed to Respondents, the letter 
directed to Hughes, and the escrow instructions detailed 
in the record on appeal at R21 through R23. 
The lower court made findings which hopefully 
the Utah Court of Appeals will find facially absurd. For 
example, the lower Court found that Westiwood Carpet was 
not a licensed contractor. This finding was entered 
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despite the fact that a xerox copy of the Westwood's 
contractorsfs license appears in the record at RIO and 
that an affidavit of George P. Weiler acting Director of 
the Utah State Division of Contractors indicates that at 
all pertinent times Dwane Jones, dba Westwood Carpet 
Center, had a current license. Furthermore/ Jones himself 
testified at trial that he had been a licensed contractor 
and was authorized by the State of Utah to contract for 
and provide for the work requested by the Defendants for 
well over a decade. TBI at 260-290. 
Additionally, the lower court, in reference to 
the agency issue, failed to resolve the very apparent 
authority of Southern Utah Title Company to act on 
Respondents1 behalf. It is a general and well settled 
principle of the law of agency, "that principals are bound 
by the acts of their agents which are within the apparent 
scope of the authority of the agent and a principal will 
not be permitted to deny such authority against innocent 
third parties who have relied on that authority." Forsyth 
v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980). Indeed, in a later 
case, Walker Bank & Trust Company v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73 
(Utah 1983), Chief Justice Hall quoting the Missouri case 
of Wynn v. McMahon Ford Company, supra, noted that where a 
person creates "such an appearance of things that it 
causes a third party reasonably and prudently to believe 
that a second party has the power to act on behalf of the 
first person, then such principals are bound by the acts 
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of their agents which are within the apparent scope of the 
authority of the agent." 
In the instant case, the tender of monies by 
Respondents to Southern Utah Title Company and the 
authorization granted over Respondents1 signatures to said 
title company created not only an appearance of authority, 
but express authority in said title company to resolve and 
settle in full the mechanic's lien filed by Westwood. 
When Westwood on September 18, 1987, requested a 
foreclosure report in reference to its action to foreclose 
a lien, said title company represented to Hughes that it 
had monies in its trust account which it could tender to 
settle the matter in full and to resolve and secure the 
release of the lien, TBI at 1-30. Clearly, there was 
apparent authority of the title company to settle this 
issue and, indeed, the title company did so, scrupulously 
copying all of their correspondence to Respondents. 
Appellants were shocked when they discovered after trial 
that when the lower court had found that the title company 
not to be the agent of Respondents. Once again, an agent's 
scope of authority includes "not only the actual 
authorization conferred upon the agent by the principal, 
but also that which has apparently been delegated to him." 
3 AmJur 2d "Agency" §78. 
Ultimately, even were Southern Utah Title 
Company to have exceeded its express authdrity in reaching 
an accord and satisfaction with Hughes, the issue, 
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nonetheless, would be which of the two innocent parties in 
such a situation must suffer from the wrongful act of the 
agent. Utah law, in conformity with general eqitable 
principles, allocates that loss to Respondents, who by 
their conduct created the circumstances which enabled the 
agent, Southern Utah Title Company, to tender the monies 
and obtain the release of lien. See Walker Bank & Trust 
v. Jones, supra; see also 3 AmJur 2d "Agency", §81. 
The Utah Court of Appeals is urged that in the 
day-to-day workings of a law office, lawyers regularly 
come into contact with title companies which seek to 
resolve their principals problems through the tende^ r of 
monies in return for the release of liens. In the instant 
case, a written authorization to the title company 
together with the tender of $1,200 by Respondents 
authorized the title company to act in an effort to obtain 
and secure a release and full satisfaction of Appellants1 
lien. This the title company did. It is strongly 
suggested that express authority to so act was conferred 
upon the title company, and, in no event, did the title 
company act outside its apparent authority. This is 
confirmed by both the representations of the title agent 
which were testified to by Hughes as well as the written 
escrow instructions in the file and the cover letter and 
correspondence directed toward Respondents by the title 
agent when the matter was settled. TBI at 1-30; R21-23. 
To obtain a satisfaction of lien through such apparent 
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authority and thereafter bring suit against Appellant for 
the money Appellant received and attempt to deny that 
authority is an act which flys in the face of the apparent 
authority which Respondents created. the Utah Court of 
Appeals should strongly reverse the lower court's 
incorrect ruling. 
III. 
THE APPELLANTS WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW BOTH 
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
In the instant case, only Dwane Jones was 
actually served with a summons. Shela Lambert appeared as 
a witness, but was never served and Allen Lafferty was 
never served and did not appear as a witness as he was out 
of town. In directing the Judgment for Respondents, the 
lower court apparently in its alacity to rule for them, 
directed Judgment against all of the named Defendants. 
TCI at 288-296. There is no basis in the law and no 
jurisdiction to support this ruling! 
In the case at bar, the trial was bifurcated. 
Mrs. Lambert, Mr. Hughes both filed Affidavits that they 
had not received notice of the continuance of the trial 
setting. R36, R43, R47. After filing t^ hese Affidavits, 
Hughes waited for a responsive affidavit to be filed on 
behalf of Respondents. None was received. Instead, some 
two weeks after Hughes filed his motion, the Judge, sua 
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spontef procured, notarized and enclosed with his ruling 
an Affidavit which in the court's mind apparently 
contravened Appellants' affidavit. R50, R52. It is 
interesting to note that the lower court's affidavit, 
notarized by the Judge, simply indicates that notice was 
delivered in normal channels, which means that it was 
placed in a public place in the Washington County 
Courthouse where the general public has access. That the 
lower court, however, can only assume that such notice was 
received in the normal course of business by Hughes. But 
Hughes' affidavit together with the affidavits of Lambert 
clearly indicate that no such notice was, in fact, 
received! 
Beyond not being responsive to Hughes' statement 
as an officer of the Court that Hughes did not receive 
notice despite the fact that the same may have been placed 
in a public location by the court's personnel, the Utah 
Court of Appeals still must ultimately consider the 
propriety of a Judge procuring and notarizing an Affidavit 
on behalf of Respondents' and ruling in conformity 
therewith simultaneously with the filing of said 
affidavit. Simply stated, neither Hughes nor the other 
Appellants, seeking a reopening of the trial, had any 
opportunity to respond to the court's self-procured 
affidavit. Indeed, having taken the opportunity to 
procure an Affidavit from his staff, perhaps the lower 
court's denial of Hughes' Motion was a foregone 
conclusion. 
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Any motion to reopen a case should always be 
considered in light of all of the circumstances and the 
granting or denying of that motion should be in the 
interest of fairness and substantial justice. See Lewis 
v. Porter, 556 P. 2d 496 (Utah 1976), citing 6(a) Moore's 
Fed. Prac. (2d Ed.) §59.04 [13] page 59-37. As Chief 
Justice Hall stated in Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 
(Utah 1983) which Hughes appealed froin the same lower 
bench, "[p]reservation of the integrity of the adversarial 
system of conducting trials precludes the court from 
infringing upon counsel's role of advocacy. Counsel is 
entitled to control the presentation of evidence, and 
should there be a failure to present evidence on a claim 
at issue, it is generally viewed as a waiver of the 
claim." 
Extending the rationale of Judge Hall further, when a 
party represents himself before any court, that party 
becomes his or her own attorney. In the instant case, the 
lower court seeking to deny Hughes1 motion to reopen this 
case, stepped in on behalf of Respondents and became their 
most able advocate in denying Hughes' motion. As a 
result, Appellants were denied procedural due process and 
the expectation of all parties that the trial court will 
refrain from exercising its adversarial skills obtained 
prior to assuming the bench. This was not the case in the 
lower tribunal. 
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IV. 
THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT CANNOT BE SUSTAINED UNDER 
THE THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT. 
The theory of quantum meruit provides that any party 
should be entitled, even in the absence of contract, to 
the reasonable value of goods and services performed or 
provided to another. Throughout the trial in the instant 
case, Respondents maintained that they owed the Appellants 
at least $576.50 for goods and materials supplied to their 
residence which was under construction. Despite these 
repeated admissions, the lower court returned to 
Respondents the maximum amount allowable in the small 
claims department, which as a result allowed Appellants to 
retain less than $200 of the money tendered to them by 
Respondents1 agent, Southern Utah Title Company. The 
Courtfs Judgment, therefore, allowed Respondents' to 
retain the material and labor supplied by the Appellant at 
a value almost three times the amount Respondents paid, 
violates basic fairness and the doctrine of quantum 
meruit, as well as Rule 54(c)(1) U.R.C.P., which indicates 
that "every final Judgment shall grant the relief to which 
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled." Id. 
In the instant case, even were this Court to 
anomalously affirm the lower court on accord and 
satisfaction and apparent authority, Respondents would, 
nonetheless, not be entitled to any more than the $1,200 
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tendered to Appellants less and excepting the $576.50 to 
which Respondents testified Westwood was entitled. This 
leaves a balance of $623.50. Ultimately this amount could 
only be found agianst the only Defendant served in this 
case, Dwane Jones. 
To reach these final arguments, this Court will have 
to find some way to affirm the lower court's obscure 
rulings on accord and satisfaction and agency. Even were 
that to be the case, the Judge's eagerness to find for the 
unrepresented and to, indeed, actively advocate their 
cause fully and faithfully cannot be sustained on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant case should have been barred by a 
full accord and satisfaction. The documents clearly 
evidencing said accord and satisfaction were presented to 
the lower court and are part of the record on appeal. 
It is clear that Southern Utah Title Company had been 
imbued by Respondents with apparent authority to act in 
their name to resolve this matter in full and satisfy the 
same. Once this had occurred, Respondents should have 
been barred from maintaining their lawsuit. That the 
lower court continued to entertain the same in light of 
the documentary evidence and proferred testimony before it 
cannot be justified and should be reversed. 
Lastly, the lower court did not act as an independent 
arbiter in reaching its decision in this case but rather 
became so involved that it procured and notarized 
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affidavits on Respondents1 behalf. Beyond that, its 
ruling violates the principals of quantum meruit and 
allows Respondents, as the ruling presently stands, to 
retain both the materials and labor provided by Westwood 
and, indeed, their money as well. 
It is unfortunate that a case from the Small Claims 
Department needs to be briefed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. This is particularly so when that case involves 
such a small amount in controversy. This brief, however, 
is filed in good faith and further with the request that 
oral argument be granted on this matter. Often it is in 
the small cases where judicial errors pass greatly 
unnoticed because the cost of an appeal is prohibitive. 
The same is frankly true in this case, but the appeal is 
taken with the hope that a reversal can ensure a better 
system of justice in this particular small claims 
department. 
Respectfully submitted this /*x day of April, 1988. 
MTCHAEL D. H U G H E S ^ 
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Bar No. 1572 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J^A^Sy of April, 1988, I 
mailed ^ T copy of the foregoing to the Respondents, Ralph and Cathy 
Iverson, at 1444 E. 1850 South, St. George, Utah 84770, postage 
fully prepaid thereon. 
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